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We propose a continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
(CV-MDI QKD) protocol, in which detection is conducted by an untrusted third party. Our protocol
can defend all detector side channels, which seriously threaten the security of a practical CV QKD
system. Its security analysis against arbitrary collective attacks is derived based on the fact that
the entanglement-based scheme of CV-MDI QKD is equivalent to the conventional CV QKD with
coherent states and heterodyne detection. We find that the maximal total transmission distance
is achieved by setting the untrusted third party close to one of the legitimate users. Furthermore,
an alternate detection scheme, a special application of CV-MDI QKD, is proposed to enhance the
security of the standard CV QKD system.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] can estab-
lish a secure key between two legitimate partners (Al-
ice and Bob) through insecure quantum and classical
channels. In recent last decades research on QKD has
evolved rapidly. Some commercial systems are available
in the market now [3]. QKD has two main approaches:
one is discrete-variable (DV) QKD, and the alternative is
continuous-variable (CV) QKD [4–6]. CV QKD has the
advantage of being compatible with standard telecom-
munication technology, especially no request on single
photon detectors. A Gaussian modulated CV QKD pro-
tocol using coherent states [7, 8] has been proved to be
secure against arbitrary collective attacks [9, 10], which
is optimal in both the asymptotic case [11] and the finite
size regime [12, 13]. A recent experiment has successfully
distributed secure keys over an 80-km optical fiber [14],
showing the potential of long distance communication us-
ing CV QKD protocols.
Generally speaking, the theoretical security analysis of
QKD relies on some ideal theoretical models. However,
the practical devices often have some imperfections and
deviate from the theoretical models. Thus the mismatch
between practical devices and their idealized models may
open security loopholes, which make the practical sys-
tems vulnerable to attacks [15]. In DV QKD systems,
various types of attacks against imperfect devices were
proposed, among which the attacks against the single
∗Corresponding author: hongguo@pku.edu.cn.
†Corresponding author: xiangpeng@pku.edu.cn.
photon detector are the most significant ones [16–18].
Recently in CV QKD systems, several attack strategies
against practical detectors were also proposed [19–24].
For example, the calibration attack [20] and local os-
cillator (LO) fluctuation attack [21] take advantage of
modifying LO to manipulate the measurement results,
which will make Alice and Bob overestimate the secret
key rate. The wavelength attack [22, 23] allows the eaves-
dropper to launch an intercept-resend attack because of
the wavelength-dependent property of the fiber beam-
splitter used in the heterodyne detector. The saturation
attack [24] can force Alice and Bob to underestimate the
excess noise by saturating the homodyne detector, which
can hide the presence of an intercept-resend attack.
A natural attempt to remove these attacks in a CV
QKD system was to characterize the specific loophole
and find a countermeasure. For instance, Jouguet et al.
proposed an efficient countermeasure against the calibra-
tion attack by monitoring the LO [20]. Once an attack
is known, prevention is usually simple. However, it is
difficult to fully characterize real detectors and account
for all loopholes. Therefore figuring out how to defend
against general attacks on detectors in practical systems
becomes critical in CV QKD.
Inspired by the novel detector-attack-immune proto-
cols, i.e. measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD
protocols [25–27], which were well analyzed in theory [28–
31] and successfully demonstrated in experiments [32–
35], here we propose a CV-MDI QKD protocol which can
also defend all detector side channels. The main idea is
that both Alice and Bob are senders and an untrusted
third party, named Charlie, is introduced to realize the
measurement. Such measurement results will be used by
Alice and Bob in the post-processing step to generate
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FIG. 1: (Color online)(a) EB scheme of the CV-MDI QKD
protocol. EPR: two-mode squeezed state. Het: heterodyne
detection. Hom1x: homodyne detection of measuring the x
quadrature. Hom2p: homodyne detection of measuring the
p quadrature. XC , PD: measurement results of Hom1x and
Hom2p, respectively. BS: 50:50 beamsplitter. (b) Equivalent
one-way model of the EB scheme under the assumptions that
Eve controls channels, Charlie and Bob’s EPR state, and the
displacement in (a).
secure keys.
By introducing the equivalent entanglement-based
(EB) scheme of this protocol, we show the security anal-
ysis against arbitrary collective attacks, which is based
on the fact that the entanglement-based scheme of CV-
MDI QKD is equivalent to the CV QKD with coher-
ent states and heterodyne detection [8]. A corresponding
prepare-and-measure (PM) scheme is proposed for imple-
mentation. Moreover, the performance of our protocol
against collective entangling cloner attack is presented
via numerical simulations. When the distance between
Alice and Charlie equals that between Bob and Char-
lie (symmetric case), the transmission distance is below
10 km. However, in the asymmetric case the transmis-
sion distance can be improved, reaching 80 km under
certain conditions. This demonstrates the feasibility of
our scheme.
This paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II, the de-
tailed descriptions of both the EB and PM schemes of
CV-MDI QKD are given. In Sec. III, we present the
security analysis for the CV-MDI QKD protocol. In Sec.
IV, we show the numerical simulation results of the se-
cret key rate, and discuss the performance and potential
applications.
II. CONTINUOUS-VARIABLE
MEASUREMENT-DEVICE-INDEPENDENT QKD
PROTOCOL
In the PM scheme of a standard QKD protocol such
as Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) [36], Alice randomly
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FIG. 2: (Color online) PM scheme of CV-MDI QKD. Hom1x:
homodyne detection of measuring the x quadrature. Hom2p:
homodyne detection of measuring the p quadrature. BS: 50:50
beam splitter.
prepares an encoded quantum state and sends it to Bob
for detection. This PM scheme can be formulated in an
EB version of the protocol as follows: Alice first creates
an entangled state such as a Bell state, and afterwards,
she measures one mode of this entangled state in a certain
basis, thereby producing the correct state for the other
mode that is sent to Bob.
In practice, the PM scheme is usually easy to apply,
while the equivalent EB scheme is convenient for security
analysis. The EB scheme of DV-MDI QKD can be seen
as a one-way protocol using entanglement swapping as
an untrusted quantum relay [25, 26]. Here we use the
same idea in our CV-MDI QKD protocol, which exploits
the continuous variable entanglement swapping [37, 38].
The EB scheme of the CV-MDI QKD protocol shown in
Fig. 1(a) is described as follows.
Step 1. Alice generates one two-mode squeezed (TMS)
state and keeps mode A1 while sending the other mode,
A2, to an untrusted third party (Charlie) through the
channel with length LAC . Bob generates another TMS
state and keeps the mode B1 while sending the other
mode, B2, to Charlie through another channel with
length LBC .
Step 2. Modes A′ and B′ received by Charlie interfere
at a beam splitter (BS) with two output modes C and D.
Then both the x quadrature of C and p quadrature of
D are measured by homodyne detections, and the mea-
surement results {XC , PD} are publicly announced by
Charlie.
Step 3. After receiving Charlie’s measurement results,
Bob displaces mode B1 by operation Dˆ (β) and gets
ρˆB1′ = Dˆ (β) ρˆB1Dˆ
† (β), where ρˆX represents the density
matrix of mode X , β = g (XC + iPD) and g represents
the gain of the displacement. Then Bob measures mode
B′1 to get the final data {XB, PB} using heterodyne de-
tection. Alice measures mode A1 to get the final data
3{XA, PA} using heterodyne detection.
Step 4. Alice and Bob use an authenticated public
channel to finish the parameter estimation, information
reconciliation, and privacy amplification steps.
After Charlie’s measurements and Bob’s displacement,
mode A1 and mode B
′
1 become entangled [37]. Therefore,
after both Alice’s and Bob’s heterodyne detections, their
final data are correlated. The equivalent PM scheme is
shown in Fig. 2, which is described as follows.
Step 1. Alice randomly prepares a coherent state
|xA + ipA〉, where xA and pA are Gaussian distributed
with variance VA − 1. Bob randomly prepares another
coherent state |xB + ipB〉, where xB and pB are Gaus-
sian distributed with variance VB − 1. Both Alice and
Bob send their coherent states to Charlie through two
different channels.
Step 2. The two modes (A′ and B′) received by Charlie
interfere at a BS with two output modes C and D. Then
both the x quadrature of C and p quadrature of D are
measured by homodyne detections, and the measurement
results {XC , PD} are publicly announced by Charlie.
Step 3. When Alice and Bob receive Charlie’s mea-
surement results, Bob modifies his data as XB = xB +
kXC , PB = pB−kPD, while Alice keeps hers unchanged,
XA = xA, PA = pA. k is the amplification coefficient
related to channel loss (the relationship between k and g
in the EB scheme is shown in Appendix A).
Step 4. Alice and Bob use an authenticated public
channel to finish the parameter estimation, information
reconciliation, and privacy amplification steps.
In the PM scheme, Alice and Bob prepare coherent
states independently and do not require any measure-
ments inside them. The third party, Charlie, is totally
untrusted. That is why the protocol can be called mea-
surement device independent. See Appendix A for the
proof of equivalence between the EB and PM schemes.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
It is well known that the security of a PM scheme is
equivalent to that of the corresponding EB scheme for a
QKD protocol [39]. In the EB scheme in Fig. 1(a), if
one further assumes that both Bob’s initial TMS state
and the displacement operation inside himself are also
untrusted, then the protocol could be seen as the well-
known one-way CV QKD protocol using coherent states
and heterodyne detection [8]. The equivalent one-way
model is shown in Fig. 1(b). Thus the EB scheme of CV-
MDI QKD is just one specific case of the equivalent one-
way model with more constraints on Eve. Therefore, the
secret key rate of the equivalent one-way model should
be a lower bound of the EB scheme. Suppose the secret
key rates (with reverse reconciliation) of the EB scheme
of CV-MDI QKD and the equivalent one-way model are,
respectively, KR1 and K
R
2 ; then K
R
2 ≤ KR1 . Although
KR2 is not very tight, it is easy to calculate [40, 41]
KR2 = βRI (XA, PA : XB, PB)− χ2 (XB, PB : E) ,
BS 
Alice Bob 
Charlie 
E1 
ηA 
D(β) 
Eve 
EPR EPR 
EPR EPR 
Het A1 A2 B
1
' Het B2 B1 
Hom1x 
C D 
A' 
XC PD 
B' 
Hom2p 
E2 E3 E6 E5 E4 
β = g (XC + i PD) 
ηB 
FIG. 3: (Color online) EB scheme of CV-MDI QKD with two
independent entangled-cloner attacks. After two channels,
mode A2 becomes A
′, and mode B2 becomes B
′. Charlie
keeps the same structure as in Fig. 1.
where I (XA, PA : XB, PB) is the classical mutual infor-
mation between Alice and Bob, βR is the reconciliation
efficiency, and χ2 (XB, PB : E) is the Holevo bound [42]
of the mutual information between Bob and Eve. Also
χ2 (XB, PB : E) = S (ρˆE)−S (ρˆE |XB, PB), where S(ρˆE)
is the von Neumann entropy of the quantum state ρˆE .
S (ρˆE |XB, PB) =
∫
P (XB, PB)S
(
ρˆE|XB ,PB
)
dXBdPB ,
P (XB, PB) is the probability of getting the measurement
results XB, PB and ρˆE|XB ,PB is the conditional density
matrix.
Generally, one can assume that Eve can purify
the whole system, which means χ2 (XB, PB : E) =
χ2 (XB, PB : A1B
′
1) [9, 10]. Thus, the secret key rate
can be written as
KR2 = βRI (XA, PA : XB, PB)
− [S (ρˆA1B′1)− S (ρˆA1B′1 |XB, PB)] . (1)
Based on the theorem of the optimality of Gaus-
sian collective attacks [43, 44], the upper bound of
χ2 (XB, PB : A1B
′
1) is only determined by the covariance
matrix γA1B′1 of the quantum state ρˆA1B′1 . In a practical
experiment, γA1B′1 can be calculated through the param-
eter estimation step.
From the analysis above, the secret key rate KR2 is
based on the assumption that Eve controls Charlie, and
it’s actually calculable in a practical experiment. There-
fore, the CV-MDI QKD protocol using KR2 as the secret
key rate is immune to all collective attacks against de-
tectors.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Numerical simulation
As discussed above, in experiment, Alice and Bob can
get the covariance matrix γA1B′1 through the parameter
estimation step. Then they can calculate the secret key
rate KR2 . In numerical simulation, a model to simulate
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Secret key rate in the symmetric case
where LAC = LBC . The red dashed line is under the ideal
condition that variance VA = VB = 10
5 and zero excess noise.
The black solid line is under the practical condition that vari-
ance VA = VB = 40 and excess noises εA = εB = 0.002 [14].
Both reconciliation efficiencies are βR = 1.
the CV-MDI QKD protocol is provided, including what
the channels are and what Charlie does. The model is
shown in Fig. 3.
We assume the channels from Alice to Charlie and
Bob to Charlie are under two independent entangling
cloner [39] attacks, and Charlie preforms a standard CV
entanglement-swapping process as the EB scheme re-
quires. All the simulations in this paper are under this
model.
We should point out that Eve’s attack described here
is not the optimal one. The entangling cloner attack is
usually used to model a Gaussian channel affected by the
environment (Eve) and is analyzed to get a sense of a pro-
tocol’s performance in experiment. In Fig. 3, the chan-
nel parameters transmittance and excess noise on Alice’s
side (Bob’s side) are ηA (ηB) and εA (εB). We assume
that both channel losses are α = 0.2 dB/km, and thus
ηA = 10
−αLAC/10 and ηB = 10−αLBC/10. The quadra-
tures’ relations are shown in Appendix B. The covariance
matrix γA1B′1 is(
VAI2
√
T (V 2A − 1)σz√
T (V 2A − 1) · σz [T (VA − 1) + 1 + Tε′] I2
)
(2)
where
I2 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, T =
ηA
2
g2, (3)
and
ε′ = 1 +
1
ηA
[ηB (χB − 1) + ηAχA]
+
1
ηA
(√
2
g
√
VB − 1−√ηB
√
VB + 1
)2
. (4)
χA =
1−ηA
ηA
+ εA, χB =
1−ηB
ηB
+ εB, and g is the gain of
displacement.
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FIG. 5: (Color online) (a) Secret key rate vs transmission
distance from Alice to Charlie LAC and from Bob to Charlie
LBC , under the practical conditions that VA = VB = 40 and
εA = εB = 0.002 [14]. (b) Secret key rate vs LAC given
different LBC . The dashed lines are under the ideal conditions
that VA = VB = 10
5 and εA = εB = 0. The solid lines are
under the same practical conditions as in (a). LBC is 0 km
for the top black solid and dashed lines [45], 1 km for the
middle blue solid and dashed lines, and 3 km for the bottom
red solid and dashed lines. Reconciliation efficiency is set to
βR = 1 for all simulations.
Comparing the covariance matrix (2) with the one-way
protocol, we can find that ε′ represents the equivalent
excess noise of the equivalent one-way model of CV-MDI
QKD. Here we choose g =
√
2
ηB
√
VB−1
VB+1
to minimize the
equivalent excess noise; thus we have
ε′ = εA +
1
ηA
[ηB (εB − 2) + 2] . (5)
We first consider the perfect reconciliation efficiency
case βR = 1. The simulation result in Fig. 4 is the
secret key rate of the symmetric case, which means
LAC = LBC . The red dashed line is under the condi-
tions that variance VA = VB = 10
5 and excess noise
εA = εB = 0, and the black solid line is under the con-
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FIG. 6: (Color online) (a) PM model of our detection scheme
for one-way CV QKD, which contains two steps; the first is
the measurement step, and the second is the data-processing
step. (b) The left panel is the secret key rate vs transmission
distance LAB when using our detection scheme for a one-way
protocol with coherent states. The reconciliation efficiency
for the red dashed line is βR = 1, and for black solid line it
is βR = 0.95. The right panel is kopt vs LAB . The simulation
is under the conditions VA = VB = 40 and εA = εB = 0.002
[45].
ditions that variance VA = VB = 40 and excess noises
εA = εB = 0.002, which is reasonable according to ex-
periment [14].
From Fig. 4, we can see that in both cases, the max-
imal total transmission distance (LAB = LAC + LBC) is
around 7km, referring to a 1.4 dB loss. If LAC = 3.5km,
even if there is no excess noise in either channel, the
equivalent excess noise in Eq. (5) is still around 0.35.
This is a very large value, and it will increase quickly
if the transmission distance gets longer. That’s why we
cannot extract the secret key at a longer distance for the
symmetric case. Hence the symmetric case can be useful
in short-distance communications. In the next section,
we will discuss how to extend the transmission distance.
B. Discussion and application
Equation (5) indicates that ε′ is not symmetric if per-
muting ηA and ηB because the postprocessing step is not
symmetric because only Bob modifies his data while Alice
keeps hers unchanged. This means that the symmetric
case cannot result in an optimal system performance.
Figure 5(a) shows the secure key rate in an asymmetric
case (LAC 6= LBC). When LBC increases, the maximal
LAC decrease dramatically. If Charlie’s position can be
close to Bob, the total transmission distance LAB can be
a relatively longer distance, up to 80km in theory [the top
black solid line in Fig. 5(b)]. Thus, the asymmetric case
of CV-MDI QKD indicates the detection scheme that will
be discussed below.
The detection scheme discussed here is the same as the
EB scheme of CV-MDI QKD except that Bob takes over
Charlie’s operations in Fig.1(a) with LBC = 0 km. Fig-
ure 6(a) shows the PM model of this detection scheme,
which contains two steps, i.e., the measurement step
and the data-processing step. The measurement step
is a modified heterodyne detection in which the vac-
uum state introduced by the BS in the standard het-
erodyne detection is replaced by a Gaussian-modulated
coherent state |αB〉. The data-processing step uses the
measurement results {XC , PD} and the means {xB, pB}
of the quadratures of |αB〉 to construct Bob’s final data
{XB = xB + kXC , PB = pB − kPD}, where k is the
amplification coefficient and will be traversed to find an
optimal value kopt which makes the secret key rate the
highest. The new detection scheme has two advantages.
First, it can defend against all collective attacks against
detectors, which is the most important feature. Second,
the traversing k can be done classically.
In a practical experiment, the reconciliation efficiency
is not 100%. Figure 6(b) shows the results for a practi-
cal reconciliation efficiency βR = 0.95 [14]; the maximal
transmission distance using our detection scheme can be
40km.
In the above analysis, almost perfect detection effi-
ciency was assumed in our simulation. Next, we will
consider a practical homodyne detector which has imper-
fections such as finite efficiency and electronic noise [46].
These imperfections will increase the “equivalent excess
noise,” i.e., εImD = εA + [ηB (εB − 2) + 2 + 2χDet]/ηA =
ε′+2χDet/ηA , which holds when traversing the displace-
ment gain g to minimize it under two independent entan-
gling cloner attacks. Here χDet = (1− ηD)/ηD+ υel/ηD,
ηD is the detector’s efficiency, and υel is the variance of
the electronic noise. Thus the secret key rate will de-
crease when the detector is imperfect. For instance, if
the detector’s efficiency reduces to 90%, even though the
electronic noise is zero, the transmission distance will be
less than 10 km. Actually, to get a nonzero transmission
distance the detector’s efficiency has to be above 85.5%
[47]. However, these imperfections can be compensated
for by optical preamplifiers [48–50].
On the other hand, the detection scheme discussed here
is very effective against the local oscillator fluctuation
attack [21] and the calibration attack [20]. The main
idea of these two kinds of attacks is that Eve can control
the scale of the measurement result by manipulating the
LO. If the correct measurement result is denoted by XO,
then Eve can force Bob to get a fake measurement result
X ′O =
√
ηXO, referring to Eq. (3) in [21]. When using
the detection scheme, the only measurement results are
6{XC , PD}. When Eve employs those two attacks, Bob
will get fake results {√ηXC ,√ηPD} and amplify them
by the amplification coefficient k in the data-processing
step. Because k will be traversed for all possible values
to get the highest secret key rate, premultiplying a pro-
portional coefficient
√
η for the measurement results by
Eve will only lead to a different optimal value of k while
the highest secret key rate is still the same. This can be
proven easily because traversing k equals traversing k
√
η
when η is a constant. Therefore, by using our detection
scheme, the final secret key rate under these two kinds of
attacks not only is never overestimated but also remains
the same as in the nonattack case.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed the continuous-variable
measurement-device-independent quantum key distribu-
tion protocol, which is immune to all collective attacks
against detectors. The numerical simulation under the
entangling cloner attack indicates that the transmission
distance between Alice and Bob is limited in the symmet-
ric case (LAC = LBC). However, when Charlie is close
to Bob, the maximal total transmission distance can still
reach 80 km for βR = 1 and 40 km for β = 0.95. A corre-
sponding detection scheme for the one-way protocol was
proposed which is immune to all collective attacks against
detectors. This detection scheme only requires slight re-
visions to the existing CV-QKD systems and thus shows
its feasibility.
Notes added : Recently, we become aware of an inde-
pendent work on the same subject [51]. Those authors
use a different security analysis method based on con-
ditional scenarios, which requires a relatively complex
postprocessing technique. They also propose a model to
describe Eve’s general attack and find the most power-
ful attack, which is very helpful for understanding Eve’s
attack strategy.
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Appendix A: Equivalence between PM scheme and
EB scheme
In CV QKD, the generation of a Gaussian-distributed
coherent state is usually modeled by measuring one mode
of a two-mode squeezed state using heterodyne detec-
tion and projecting another mode onto a coherent state.
Therefore if we modify the PM scheme by replacing the
state preparation step by two other steps, of which the
first is Alice and Bob independently generate two TMS
states ρˆA1A2 and ρˆB1B2 and the second is they mea-
sure modes A1 and B1 by heterodyne detections, then
the modified protocol is equivalent to the original PM
scheme. Next, we will show the equivalence between the
modified protocol and the EB scheme.
Suppose Alice’s initial state is ρˆA0A1A2 , where mode
A0 is the vacuum state introduced by the heterodyne
detection. Bob’s initial state is ρˆB0B1B2 , where mode
B0 is the vacuum state introduced by the heterodyne
detection. The initial density matrix of whole system
including Eve can be written as ρˆ0 = ρˆA0A1A2 ⊗ ρˆE ⊗
ρˆB0B1B2 . ρˆE may contain multimodes.
For the modified protocol, suppose Alice’s initial mea-
surement results are {xA, pA} and Bob’s are {x′B, p′B},
then the state Eve gets is
ρˆ
(xApA,x′Bp′B)
A2B2E
=
〈xA, pA, x′B, p′B|UBSA1A0UBSB1B0 ρˆ0U
BS†
A1A0
U
BS†
B1B0
|xA, pA, x′B, p′B〉
p (xA, pA, x′B, p
′
B)
(A1)
where p (xA, pA, x
′
B, p
′
B) (pAB for short) is the probability of getting measurement results {xA, pA, x′B, p′B}. Eve will
get the measurement resultsXC and PD according to a positive operator-valued measurement {|XC , PD〉 〈XC , PD|} on
two certain modes, after applying a unitary operation UA2B2E . Thus the joint probability of {xA, pA, x′B , p′B, XC , PD}
is
pABE = Pr (xA, pA, x
′
B , p
′
B, XC , PD)M = pAB 〈XC , PD|UA2B2E ρˆ
(xApA,x′Bp′B)
A2B2E
U
†
A2B2E
|XC , PD〉
= 〈xA, pA, x′B , p′B, XC , PD|UBSA1A0UBSB1B0UA2B2E ρˆ0U †A2B2EU
BS†
B1B0
U
BS†
A1A0
|xA, pA, x′B, p′B, XC , PD〉 (A2)
Because in the last step Bob modifies his data by XB = x
′
B + k1XC , PB = p
′
B − k1PD, the joint probability of final
7data {XA, PA, XB, PB, XC , PD} is
p′ABE = Pr (XA, PA, XB, PB , XC , PD)D = Pr (XA, PA, XB − k1XC , PB + k1PD, XC , PD)M
= 〈XA, PA, XB − k1XC , PB + k1PD, XC , PD|UBSA1A0UBSB1B0UA2B2E ρˆ0U †A2B2EU
BS†
B1B0
U
BS†
A1A0
× |XA, PA, XB − k1XC , PB + k1PD, XC , PD〉
= 〈XA, PA, XB, PB, XC , PD| DˆB1 (k1XC) DˆB0 (−ik1PD)UBSA1A0UBSB1B0UA2B2E ρˆ0U †A2B2EU
BS†
B1B0
U
BS†
A1A0
×Dˆ†B1(k1XC)Dˆ
†
B0
(−ik1PD) |XA, PA, XB, PB , XC , PD〉 . (A3)
The measurement applied on mode B1 or B0 is homodyne detection (measuring the x quadrature of B1 or the p
quadrature of B0); thus an extra displacement of the p quadrature on B1 or x quadrature on B0 will not change the
joint probability p′ABE . Therefore
p′ABE = 〈XA, PA, XB, PB, XC , PD| DˆB1 (k1 (XC + iPD)) DˆB0 (−k1 (XC + iPD))UBSA1A0UBSB1B0UA2B2E ρˆ0
×U †A2B2EU
BS†
A1A0
U
BS†
B1B0
Dˆ
†
B1
(k1 (XC + iPD))Dˆ
†
B0
(−k1 (XC + iPD)) |XA, PA, XB, PB , XC , PD〉 (A4)
Suppose the quadratures of mode B0 and B1 are xˆB0 , pˆB0 and xˆB1 , pˆB1 . After passing through the 50:50 BS first
and then two displacements DˆB1 (k1 (XC + iPD)) , DˆB0 (−k1 (XC + iPD)), these quadratures become xˆ′A0 , pˆ′A0 and
xˆ′A1 , pˆ
′
A1
. Then 

xˆ′B0 =
1√
2
(xˆB0 + xˆB1) + k1XC =
1√
2
(
xˆB0 +
(
xˆB1 +
√
2k1XC
))
pˆ′B0 =
1√
2
(pˆB0 + pˆB1) + k1PD =
1√
2
(
pˆB0 +
(
pˆB1 +
√
2k1PD
))
xˆ′B1 =
1√
2
(xˆB0 − xˆB1)− k1XC = 1√2
(
xˆB0 −
(
xˆB1 +
√
2k1XC
))
pˆ′B1 =
1√
2
(pˆB0 − pˆB1)− k1PD = 1√2
(
pˆB0 −
(
pˆB1 +
√
2k1PD
)) (A5)
They are the same as firstly displacing DˆB1
(√
2k1 (XC + iPD)
)
on mode B1 and then passing through the BS. Thus,
we have
p′ABE = 〈XA, PA, XB, PB , XC , PD|
[
UBSB1B0DˆB1
(√
2k1 (XC + iPD)
)]
UBSA1A0UA2B2E ρˆ0
×U †A2B2EU
BS†
A1A0
[
Dˆ
†
B1
(√
2k1 (XC + iPD)
)
U
BS†
B1B0
]
|XA, PA, XB, PB , XC , PD〉 . (A6)
For the EB scheme, Eve does the measurement first. We make the same assumption as above; then after Eve gets
the measurement results {XC , PD}, the state left for Alice and Bob will be
ρˆ
(XC ,PD)
A0A1B0B1
=
〈XC , PD|UA2B2E ρˆ0U †A2B2E |XC , PD〉
p (XC , PD)
, (A7)
where p (XC , PD) is the probability of getting measurement results {XC , PD}. Then Bob will displace mode B1
first by DˆB1 (g (XC + iPD)) and measure it using a heterodyne detector. The probability of getting the final data
{XA, PA, XB, PB} given {XC , PD} is
pAB|CD = Pr (XA, PA, XB, PB |XC , PD) = 〈XA, PA, XB, PB|UBSB1B0DˆB1 (g (XC + iPD))UBSA1A0
×ρˆ(XC ,PD)A0A1B0B1U
BS†
A1A0
Dˆ
†
B1
(g (XC + iPD))U
BS†
B1B0
|XA, PA, XB, PB〉 . (A8)
The joint probability of all variables {XA, PA, XB, PB, XC , PD} is
p′′ABE = pAB|CDp (XC , PD) = 〈XA, PA, XB, PB , XC , PD|
[
UBSB1B0DˆB1 (g (XC + iPD))
]
UBSA1A0
×UA2B2E ρˆ0U †A2B2EU
BS†
A1A0
[
Dˆ
†
B1
(g (XC + iPD))U
BS†
B1B0
]
|XA, PA, XB, PB, XC , PD〉 . (A9)
It is easy to check that the two joint probabilities p′ABE and p
′′
ABE are the same once we let g equal
√
2k1. Therefore
the EB scheme is equal to the modified protocol, and because of the equivalence between the modified protocol and
the PM scheme, the EB scheme further equals the PM scheme.
In the modified protocol, if Bob’s initial measurement results are {x′B, p′B}, then the coherent state sent out from
him is |xA + ipA〉, where xA =
√
2VB−1VB+1x
′
A and pA =
√
2VB−1VB+1p
′
A. So the amplification coefficient k in the PM scheme
is described as k = k1√
2
VB−1
VB+1
= g√
VB−1
VB+1
.
8Appendix B: Relationship of quadratures used in numerical simulation
After passing through the channels, {
Aˆ′ =
√
ηAAˆ2 +
√
1− ηAEˆ2
Bˆ′ =
√
ηBBˆ2 +
√
1− ηBEˆ5 . (B1)
Modes A′ and B′ interfere on the 50:50 BS, then modes C and D are

Cˆ = 1√
2
(
Aˆ′ − Bˆ′
)
= 1√
2
(√
ηAAˆ2 −√ηBBˆ2
)
+ 1√
2
(√
1− ηAEˆ2 −
√
1− ηBEˆ5
)
Dˆ = 1√
2
(
Aˆ′ + Bˆ′
)
= 1√
2
(√
ηAAˆ2 +
√
ηBBˆ2
)
+ 1√
2
(√
1− ηAEˆ2 +
√
1− ηBEˆ5
) . (B2)
After the displacement, mode B′1 becomes

Bˆ′1x = Bˆ1x + gCˆx =
(
Bˆ1x − g
√
ηB√
2
Bˆ2x
)
+ g
√
ηA√
2
Aˆ2x +
g√
2
(√
1− ηAEˆ2x −
√
1− ηBEˆ5x
)
Bˆ′1p = Bˆ1p + gDˆp =
(
Bˆ1p + g
√
ηB√
2
Bˆ2p
)
+ g
√
ηA√
2
Aˆ2p +
g√
2
(√
1− ηAEˆ2p +
√
1− ηBEˆ5p
) . (B3)
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